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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal relates to the application of the Idaho Emergency Communications Act, 
chapter 48, title 31, Idaho Code ("Act") to TracFone Wireless, Inc. ("TracFone"), the largest 
provider of prepaid wireless services in the United States. R., p. 433. Since being allowed to 
operate in Idaho, TracFone has refused to remit the statutorily required emergency 
communications fee ("911 Fee" or "Fee") to the Idaho counties and the Idaho Emergency 
Communications Commission ("IECC"), on the basis that TracFone sells "prepaid" wireless 
services and is thus exempt from the Act. Ada County, the Idaho Association of Counties1 
("IAC"), the State of Idaho, and the IECC argue that the collection and remittance requirements 
of the Act apply to TracFone, and seek to recoup the improperly withheld 911 Fees. In a partial 
summary judgment determination, the District Court found that the Act applies to TracFone, and 
reiterated that finding after reconsidering the earlier ruling at TracFone's request. TracFone 
sought permission and subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal. 
A. Factual Background. 
As TracFone's version of the facts in its Appellant's Opening Brief ("Appellant's Brief') 
contains several unsupported assertions, Ada County submits its own statement of the facts 
herein.2 
1 Ada County adopts the argwnents the IAC makes in its Response Brief filed in this case. 
2 It appears that TracFone is attempting to introduce new evidence on appeal, as throughout its 
Appellant's Brief, TracFone continuously fails to cite to the Record in support of its factual 
allegations. For instance, TracFone's section entitled "Prepaid Wireless Service" contains no 
citations to the Record. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. As another example, TracFone's factual 
assertion, "With prepaid service, in contrast, there is no monthly or any other bill, and no 
1 
1. The Idaho Emergency Communications Act and its Amendments. 
The Idaho Emergency Communications Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1988. As 
noted by the District Court, the purpose of the Act remains the same today as it did in 1988: 
The broad purpose of the Act then, as now, was to "finance the initiation, 
maintenance, operation, enhancement and governance of consolidated emergency 
communications systems" throughout the state of Idaho by the imposition of a 
small monthly "telephone user line fee" ... on the Idaho-based customers of the 
phone companies, to be paid by the customer to the phone company and then 
remitted by the phone company to the appropriate Idaho county. LC.§ 31-4801; 
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 1027-28. 
R. p. 1031. As wireless phones were not generally available in 1988, the focus of the Act was on 
telephone land-line based service. 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, p. 1028. 
The Act was first amended in 2003, some fifteen (15) years after enactment. As part of 
the amendment process, the Legislature significantly modified § 31-4801 (the purpose and intent 
financial transaction occurs between the wireless service provider and the customer," is not cited 
to, nor supported by, the Record. Id., p. 9. See also, Appellant's Brief, p. 13 ("This case arises 
out of several years' worth of analysis ... by members of the IECC, during which time there was 
a well-documented and uniform understanding that the Act ... did not encompass prepaid 
wireless services."); p. 37 fn. 16 (" ... TracFone does not render bills for its services and has no 
such 'billing arrangements.'"); p. 46 ("Some of these changes were undoubtedly influenced by 
the Attorney General's 1994 Opinion .... "); p. 51 (" ... the IECC knew all along that the 
legislature needed to adopt 'prepaid legislation .... '"). As this Court has consistently held, 
"[a]appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented 
below . . . As a result, the introduction of this information on appeal is improper and will be 
disregarded." State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609 ---, 329 P.3d 391, 395, fn. 1 (Ct.App. 2014). 
Regarding the failure to cite to factual allegations, this Court has said, "[ o ]ne can only presume, 
then, that if points of authority are conspicuously missing from [a party's] argument, they must 
simply not exist. In any event, this Court is not required to go fishing through the record on 
counsel's behalf. Instead, we simply do not consider this unsupported argument on appeal." 
City of Meridian v. Petra Incorporated, 154 Idaho 425,451,299 P.3d 232,258 (2013). 
2 
section) and added several definitions, including the definition of "wireless carrier." 2003 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, pp. 784-790. 
The Act was next amended in 2004, whereby the Idaho Emergency Communications 
Commission and the Emergency Communications Fund were created. In 2007, the Act was 
amended once more, this time modifying the definition of "telecommunications provider" to 
include subsections ( c) and ( d). Also, the Legislature amended § 31-4813 to include language 
that prepaid wireless phones are not considered prepaid calling cards (§ 31-4813 specifically 
exempts calling cards from the imposition of the Fee). 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws, pp. 995-999. 
In 2013, House Bill 193 ("2013 Bill") was passed, with an effective date of January 1, 
2014. The 2013 Bill did away with the monthly Fee collection schedule and adjusted the amount 
of the 911 Fee to account for the manner in which prepaid services are purchased. Referred to as 
"point of sale" legislation, it places the Fee collection duty with the retailer (such as Walmart) 
who sells the product to the consumer. Idaho Code § 31-4813; 2014 Sess. Laws, p. 525. 
2. The Pertinent Language of the Idaho Emergency Communications Act. 
Chapter 48, title 31 of the Idaho Code sets forth the requirements for the imposition, 
collection and remittance of the 911 Fee, which "shall be a uniform amount not to exceed one 
dollar ($1.00) per month per access or interconnected VoIP service line . ... "3 Idaho Code 
3 "Access line" is defined as "any telephone line, trunk line, network access register, dedicated 
radio signal, or equivalent that provides switched telecommunications access to a consolidated 
emergency communications system from either a service address or a place of primary use 
within this state. In the case of wireless technology, each active dedicated telephone number 
shall be considered a single access line." Idaho Code§ 31-4802(1). 
3 
§ 31-4804(1) ( emphasis added). Section 31-4804(2) creates the actual Fee collection duty, and 
reads: 
The fee shall be imposed upon and collected from purchasers of access lines or 
interconnected VoIP service lines with a service address or place of primary use 
within the county or 911 service area on a monthly basis by all 
telecommunications providers of such services. The fee may be listed as a 
separate item on the customers' monthly bills. 
Idaho Code § 31-4804(2) ( emphasis added). Each telecommunications provider must then remit 
the Fee to the county treasurer. Idaho Code § 31-4804(3). 
Importantly, the Act includes a definition section for several of its terms, including 
"telecommunications provider," which reads: 
(13) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing: 
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this state; or 
(b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any customer 
having a place of primary use within the state; or 
( c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of primary use 
within this state; or 
(d) A provider of any other communications service that connects an individual 
having either a service address or a place of primary use within this state to an 
established public safety answering point by dialing 911. 
Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13). 
The Act also defines the term "wireless carrier" to mean "a cellular licensee, a personal 
communications service licensee, and certain specialized mobile radio providers designated as 
covered carriers by the federal communications commission in 47 CFR 20.18 and any successor 
to such rule." Idaho Code § 31-4802(15). 
The definitions of "telecommunications provider" and "wireless carrier" are central to 
this Appeal and subsequent Cross-Appeal. 
4 
3. TracFone Wireless, Inc. 
The Appellant in this case, TracFone Wireless, Inc., is the largest provider of prepaid 
wireless service in the United States, serving over 17 million customers under the brands 
TracFone, NETl0, Straight Talk, and SafeLink Wireless. R. p. 433. TracFone is a 98% owned 
subsidiary of America Movil, the fourth largest wireless telecommunications carrier in the world, 
serving over 260 million customers in Latin America, the Caribbean and the United States. Id. 
TracFone's market share of prepaid wireless services continues to grow, and constitutes over 
30% of the United States' market. Id. In Idaho, TracFone has provided these services since 
1997. R. pp. 400,433. 
Regarding its services, 
TracFone offers real-time, two-way switched voice service interconnected with 
the public switched network in Idaho. "The voice grade access provided by 
TracFone enables a user of telecommunications services to transmit voice 
communications, including signaling the network that the caller wishes to place a 
call, and to receive voice communications, including receiving a signal indicating 
there is an incoming call." 
R. pp. 531-532 ( citations and footnotes omitted). TracFone submitted to the Idaho Public 
Utilities Commission ("IPUC"): 
TracFone has implemented and will continue to implement enhanced 911 
("E911") services consistent with the FCC's Rules, including 47 C.F.R. 
§ 54.101(a)(5), and orders when such services are made available by the carriers 
from whom TracFone purchases services. In particular, TracFone will fully 
comply with the FCC's E911 requirements applicable to wireless resellers. 
Pursuant to the FCC's E911 Order, providers that use other carriers' facilities to 
provide wireless voice service to customers have an obligation to comply with the 
FCC's E91 l rules "to the extent that the underlying facilities-based licensee has 
deployed the facilities necessary to deliver enhanced 911 information to the 
appropriate PSAP [public service answering point]. TracFone will make 
5 
available access to E911 service in accordance with applicable FCC requirements. 
In addition, in accordance with 47 C.F.R. § 54.202(a)(2), TracFone has the ability 
to remain functional in emergency situations. As described in the Application, 
TracFone provides service in Idaho by reselling services of underlying wireless 
network carriers, including AT&T Mobility, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless. 
Those network operators have implemented state-of-the-art network reliability 
standards and TracFone and its customers benefit from their high standards. 
Throughout its ten years of existence, TracFone's service reliability has compared 
favorably with that of any facilities-based operator in the wireless 
telecommunications industry. 
R. pp. 377-378 (internal citations omitted). 
Simply stated, TracFone's customers have the ability to make and receive calls, just as 
with a standard land-line. This includes the ability to connect to a public safety answering point 
( dispatch center) by dialing 911. 4 
4. TracFone's Continuous Failure to Remit the 911 Fee. 
TracFone's arguments throughout this litigation have not been static, but the consistent 
theme has been that the Act does not apply to it. TracFone's arguments have varied from 
asserting that the incorrect party is suing it, that the Act is unclear, that it does not fall within any 
of the statutory subsections, and that its business model permits it to ignore the Act. Aside from 
this, there is also basis to believe that TracFone simply refuses to pay any 911 fees. 
In 2009, TracFone applied with the IPUC for eligible telecommunications earner 
("ETC") status in Idaho. Part of the approval process required TracFone to show that ETC 
4 As recognized by the District Court, "TracFone concedes that its Idaho customers receive an 
active dedicated telephone number providing access to consolidated emergency communications 
systems provided by the state. Accordingly, TracFone's Idaho customers are purchasers of 
access lines and hence are subject to the fee under the unambiguous language of the Act." R. p. 
1037. 
6 
approval was in the public's interest. In July of 2009, the IPUC denied ETC status for TracFone, 
stating: "The Commission finds that TracFone has failed to demonstrate that granting its 
Amended Application for ETC designation in Idaho would be in the 'public interest."' R. p. 930. 
The IPUC based its refusal on TracFone's failure to pay Idaho's statutory fees: 
The IECA [Idaho Emergency Communications Act] and ITSAP [Idaho 
Telecommunications Service Assistance Program] are applicable to TracFone. 
The plain and unambiguous language of these laws requires all 
telecommunications carriers including prepaid wireless carriers - to remit fees 
established under those statutes. See Idaho Code §56-901 (2). "The language of a 
statute is to be given its plain, rational and obvious meaning." (Citation omitted) 
TracFone will not be allowed to escape the duty to remit the surcharges simply 
because it chooses not to bill its customers on a monthly basis. 
R. p. 932 ( emphasis in original). 
The IPUC's Order continued, noting that while TracFone had exhibited "staunch 
opposition" to the ITSAP and IECA fees, the success of each program "hinges upon the support 
of the telecommunications carriers operating in Idaho." R. pp. 933, 944. The IPUC was highly 
critical of TracFone's assertion that its prepaid model exempted it from paying any fees, pointing 
out that "TracFone witness Jose Fuentes conceded at the technical hearing the Company has the 
ability to track the usage rate of its customers and 'calculate the amount of tax due without any 
problem with uniformity."' R. p. 933. The IPUC determined that, 
The testimony and supporting documentation presented in this case revealed that 
contesting the payment of these fees is an orchestrated and Company-wide 
business decision. Rather understatedly, TracFone acknowledged that disputes 
over fee issues "have come up around the country." Thus, it is evident to this 
Commission that it is TracFone policy to vigorously contest the applicability and 
payment of these fees. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
7 
In May of 2012, TracFone and the IPUC reached a stipulated settlement which allowed 
TracFone ETC status in return for paying retroactively the unpaid ITSAP fees. The stipulation 
further required that TracFone "file a Declaratory Judgment Action" in the Fourth District Court 
requesting a legal determination as to whether TracFone is required to pay the "emergency 
communications fee .... " R. p. 505. That requirement is the genesis of this lawsuit and appeal. 
B. Procedural History. 
On June 4, 2012, based on its settlement agreement with the IPUC, TracFone filed a 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment against the State of Idaho and the IECC, and presented the 
following issue for determination: "[W]hether Idaho Code § 31-4804 as enacted, imposes the 
Emergency Communications Fee on purchasers of non-billed prepaid wireless services and 
legally obligates resellers of non-billed prepaid wireless services to collect and remit the 
Emergency Communications Fee." R. p. 18. 
On June 29, 2012, the State and IECC filed an Answer and Counterclaim in which the 
parties answered the various allegations contained in the Complaint and set forth a Counterclaim 
alleging that TracFone, as a telecommunications provider, is required, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 31-4804, to collect the Emergency Communications Fee from its customers on a monthly 
basis, and to remit such Fees to the Idaho counties. R. p. 24. Further, the Counterclaim alleged 
that TracFone had failed to collect and remit such fees to the counties for the entirety of the nine 
(9) years it had been required to do so. Id. Consequently, the Counterclaim requested that the 
Court: 
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1. Declar[e] and determin[e] that TracFone is legally obligated under Idaho 
Code § 31-4801, et seq. to collect and remit the Emergency Communications 
Fee[; and] 
2. Order[] TracFone to remit past due fees accrued over the past nine (9) 
years that the fee has been applicable to wireless telecommunications providers in 
Idaho, whatever the total amount is determined to be. 
R.p. 25. 
In response, on August 6, 2012, TracFone filed a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, 
arguing in part that the State and IECC failed to name an indispensable party, namely, the Idaho 
counties, as "the omitted counties and 911 service areas are the parties who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the 911 fees and who would be the recipients of any of the fees at issue." R. p. 
3 3. As such, TracF one argued, the State and IECC lacked standing to pursue the Counterclaim. 
On September 11, 2012, the State and IECC responded, arguing that the IECC did have 
standing to pursue the recovery of the unpaid 911 fees, since the IECC is entitled to a portion of 
the unpaid fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 31-4804. R. pp. 39-72. 
The District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on October 16, 2012, 
holding that the State and IECC have standing with respect to the declaratory relief count of their 
Counterclaim, but that "it is by no means certain that they have standing to seek the back-fees 
owed to each county (if any)." R. p. 95. The Court recognized that Idaho counties have the 
power to sue and be sued, and that the powers granted to counties can only be exercised by the 
boards of county commissioners, or by agents and officers acting under their authority, or 
authority of law. Id 
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After being made aware of the standing concerns, both Ada County and the IAC ( on 
behalf of the remaining forty-three (43) counties) moved to intervene in the litigation, and in 
April of 2013, the District Court ordered the counties joined. R. pp. 330-545. 
After becoming parties, the IECC, Ada County and IAC brought a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. R. pp. 1028-1050. In August of 2013, the District Court issued its Decision, 
concluding that "Section 31-4802(13)(d) applies to TracFone, making it a 'telecommunications 
provider' and thus subject to the Act's fee collection duty." R. p. 1048-1049. 
TracFone filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 22, 2013. R. pp. 1064-1719. 
After briefing and argument by the parties, the District Court took the Motion under advisement 
and issued its Decision on December 31, 2013, denying TracFone's Motion. R. pp. 1838-1859. 
TracFone then filed a Motion for I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, 
which the District Court ultimately granted. R. pp. 1860-1880. This Appeal followed. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether Ada County is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-121, 12-123, and/or Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
III. ARGUMENT 
[I]t is hereby declared that the intent and purpose of the provisions of this act are 
to . . . [p ]rovide authority to counties and 911 service areas to impose an 
emergency communications fee on the use of telephone lines, wireless, VoIP or 
other communications services that connect an individual dialing 911 to an 
established public safety answering point . ... 
Idaho Code§ 31-4801(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
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The literal words of this section are so clear that even a quick perusal shows that the 
Legislature intended for the Emergency Communications Fee prescribed by the Act to apply to 
"the use of' communications services that "connect an individual dialing 911 to an established 
public safety answering point." This clear, unambiguous language leaves no room for doubt that 
the Legislature intended for the Act to apply to any communications service that connects an 
individual dialing 911 to an established public safety answering point. In other words, if a 
person dials 911, regardless of the communications service he or she uses (whether it be a 
standard land-line or wireless phone, and regardless of whether the customer "prepays" or 
"postpays"), that use is subject to the 911 Fee. 
The rest of the Act must be read with this legislative intent in mind, a requirement that 
was overlooked by TracFone, but not lost on the District Court "The Court may not ignore a 
public safety determination clearly and unambiguously made by the legislature establishing a 
method to insure a funding mechanism is available to assure Idaho citizens of an adequately 
funded emergency 911 service within the state." R. p. 1048. The District Court recognized from 
the literal words of the statute that providing emergency communications systems in the state of 
Idaho, along with the necessary funding for such systems, is a public health and safety issue that 
the Legislature intended to address through the Act. 
By virtue of this appeal, TracFone is attempting to escape from this legislatively 
mandated Fee.5 However, as found by the District Court and argued by the counties and the state 
5 TracFone would have this Court believe that none of the prepaid wireless providers in Idaho 
have ever collected and remitted the 911 Fee. R. p. 686-687. This is simply incorrect. Virgin 
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of Idaho, customers who purchase prepaid wireless services are just as obligated to pay the 911 
Fee as a person who calls 911 and connects to a public safety answering point by using a 
landline. There is no difference in the ability to connect to the dispatch system, and no 
difference in the type of emergency services received. The same ambulance will respond 
regardless of whether the caller uses a landline or wireless phone (prepaid or otherwise). Despite 
this fact, TracFone is attempting to shift this responsibility onto every other user of Idaho's 
emergency communications systems. As found by the District Court, and for the reasons argued 
below, TracFone's attempt fails. 
A. Standard of Review. 
As the Record below indicates, the District Court granted the IECC, IAC and Ada 
County's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and denied TracFone's Motion for 
Reconsideration, generally upholding its ruling on summary judgment. "The decision to grant or 
deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Jordan v. Beek, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). However, since TracFone's 
appeal challenges the District Court's legal conclusions and not the actual denial of the Motion 
for Reconsideration, Ada County submits that the summary judgment standard of review is 
appropriate. See, Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259 (2012). 
Mobile, a provider of prepaid wireless services in Idaho, has been paying the Fee to Ada County 
since October 2010. R. p. 718-719. The following prepaid wireless service providers have also 
been paying - Consumer Cellular has paid Ada County since March 2008; Cricket has paid since 
September 2001; GreatCall has paid since April 2008; Boost has paid since September 2008; and 
Clear has paid since February 2008. Id. 
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When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard as 
the district court. Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,855,318 
P.3d 622, 624 (2014). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 
56( c ). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 
737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (citations omitted). This Court also exercises free review 
when interpreting the meaning of a statute. In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho 345, ---, 326 P.3d 
347, 350 (2014). 
As this interlocutory appeal results from the District Court's Rule 54(b) certification, 
there are unique considerations to keep in mind. "Appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from an 
interlocutory decision certified under Rule 54(b) is limited to the rulings or orders certified by 
the district court." Taylor v. AJA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 574, 261 P.3d 829, 851 (2011). 
"Because of the nature of an interlocutory appeal, we address only the precise question that was 
presented to and decided by the trial court."6 Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892, 265 P .3d 502, 505 (2011 ). "Interlocutory appeals should not be 
6 In Verska, the plaintiffs requested that this Court address the scope ofidaho Code§ 39-1392c, 
even though the plaintiffs admitted that the district court did not address that issue in its decision. 
This Court declined. "Because there was not a ruling on that issue by the district court, we will 
not address it on appeal." Verska, 151 Idaho at 898, 265 P.3d at 511, citing Brian and Christie, 
Inc. v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 29,244 P.3d 166, 173 (2010). 
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used to guide the lower court on issues that have not yet been raised."7 Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 
610,621,315 P.3d 798,809 (2013). 
B. This Court Has Succinctly Set Forth the Requirements of Statutory Interpretation. 
The requirements of statutory interpretation have been clearly defined by this Court: 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. 
Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this language should 
be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
construction. 
Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho at 856, 318 P .3d at 625 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent, which must be 
derived from the plain language of the statute itself. If the intent is clear from the literal words of 
the statute, it will be deemed unambiguous, and courts need not look any further. 
Only when a statute's meaning is unclear after a reading of its plain language will it be 
considered ambiguous, which occurs when: 
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain 
or disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not established merely 
because different possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the 
7 Despite TracFone's allegations to the contrary, the issue of whether the Fee imposed by the Act 
is a "fee" or a "tax" has not been presented to or decided by the District Court. See R. p. 1743. 
Since the District Court did not address the issue in either of its Memoranda, it did not certify the 
issue for appeal. See generally R. pp. 1028-1050; pp. 1838-1859. This point is ignored by 
TracFone, as it matter-of-factly states that the Fee is a "tax." Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-13. This 
Court therefore cannot address the matter, and TracFone's conclusory statements and case law 
cited to in support of its contention cannot be considered. However, should the Court consider 
TracFone's arguments, Ada County agrees with and joins the position taken by the IAC in its 
Response Brief addressing TracFone's "tax versus fee" arguments. See IAC's Response Brief. 
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case then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered 
ambiguous .... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because as astute mind can 
devise more than one interpretation of it. 
Id. Importantly, "the fact that two different interpretations of a statute are presented does not 
alone make a statute ambiguous."8 
The Idaho Legislature has also given its instructions on how to interpret a statute: 
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of 
the legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. 
The literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative 
intent. 
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. Interpretations which would render the 
statute a nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are disfavored. 
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the 
approved usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and such 
others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are 
defined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to such 
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 
Idaho Code§ 73-113. The Idaho Code is consistent with Idaho case law. 
8 In support of its convoluted contention that "if this Court reaches the conclusion that § 31-4802 
does not omit non-licensed providers of wireless services, then somehow this Court has no other 
choice but to conclude that § 31-4804(13)(d) is ambiguous" (an argument that is in direct 
contradiction to its previous argument that § 31-4804(13)(d) is not ambiguous), TracFone 
supplies this Court with a citation concerning statutory ambiguity: "Citing to well-settled Idaho 
law governing statutory interpretation, TracFone noted that 'where the [statutory] language is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction,' the 'statute is ambiguous."' Appellant's 
Brief, p. 39. Unfortunately, TracFone has failed to provide the complete picture regarding this 
Court's position on ambiguous statutes. 
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C. In Properly Applying the Requirements of Statutory Interpretation, the District 
Court Was Correct in Holding that Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(d) Unambiguously 
Applies to TracFone. 
In following the direction of this Court regarding statutory interpretation, the District 
Court held: 
However, upon due consideration of the arguments and authorities presented, and 
in deference to the power of the Idaho legislature to adopt a clear statement of the 
intent of the legislation as expressed within the four comers of the statute, the 
Court maintains its ruling that unlicensed resellers of wireless service are 
"telecommunications providers" under the plain and unambiguous language of 
section 31-4802(13)( d). 
R. pp. 1849-1850. The District Court appropriately followed the requirements of statutory 
interpretation while undertaking this analysis. TracFone, on the other hand, would have this 
Court ignore those well-founded requirements and in effect re-write subsection (d) to ensure that 
resellers of prepaid wireless services are not included in the Fee collection and remittance 
requirements of the Act, contrary to the clearly stated purposes of the Idaho Legislature. 
TracFone continues to argue that it is exempt from these requirements because its chosen 
business model allows it to slip through the cracks. 
TracFone goes to great lengths to discredit the District Court's analysis, and resorts to 
calling the analysis "tortured" and "a strained effort." Appellant's Brief, p. 26. Simply reading 
both of the District Court's decisions shows that nothing could be further from the truth. The 
District Court conducted a thorough, thoughtful and legally justified analysis, all the while 
following the law on statutory interpretation, and ultimately relying on the plain language of the 
statutes to reach its conclusion that TracFone is subject to the requirements of the Act. 
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1. The District Court Correctly Held that the Plain Language of Idaho Code 
§ 31-4802(13)(d) Applies to TracFone. 
As held by the District Court, Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)( d) unambiguously applies to 
TracFone, as TracFone is a provider of any other communications service that connects its 
customers having either a service address or place of primary use in Idaho to an established 
public safety answering point by dialing 911. TracFone is therefore a "telecommunications 
provider" under the statute. R. p. 1042. 
The definition of "telecommunications provider"9 is found in Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 ), 
which reads: 
(13) "Telecommunications provider" means any person providing: 
(a) Exchange telephone service to a service address within this state; or 
(b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service to any customer 
having a place of primary use within the state; or 
( c) Interconnected VoIP service to any customer having a place of primary use 
within this state; or 
(d) A provider of any other communications service that connects an individual 
having either a service address or a place of primary use within this state to an 
established public safety answering point by dialing 911. 
Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13) ( emphasis added). 
Subsection ( d) is the focus of TracF one's Appeal. 10 As the District Court explained, this 
section is a "residual clause" designed to encompass the remaining categories of 
9 TracFone continues to maintain that it is not covered by the definition of "telecommunications 
provider." However, there is nothing in the stated purpose and intent section of the Act (or 
anywhere else in the Act) that suggests that the Legislature intended to exclude any provider of 
telecommunications services. In fact, the opposite is true - the expressly stated intent and 
~urpose of the Act is for all telecommunications providers to be subject to its requirements. 
0 There is no dispute among the parties that subsections (a) and (c) are inapplicable here. 
However, Ada County disagrees with the District Court's analysis that subsection (b) does not 
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telecommunications providers and their services not already more specifically defined in the 
proceeding subsections. R. p. 1033. The addition of this section in 2007 was the Legislature's 
recognition that the telecommunications industry is ever-changing, 11 and it was foresightful 
enough to include a provision like subsection ( d) to encompass such industry changes. 
From a statutory interpretation standpoint, it is helpful to break subsection ( d) into two 
components. TracFone must first be a "provider of any other communications service." Then, 
that service must "connect[] an individual having either a service address or place of primary use 
within this state to an established public safety answering point by dialing 911." As found by the 
District Court, TracFone meets each component. 
Regarding the ability of TracFone's customers to connect to a public safety answering 
point by dialing 911, the District Court found, and TracFone does not dispute, that its services 
"connect an individual having either a service address or place of primary use within this state to 
an established public safety answering point by dialing 911." As the District Court explained, 
" ... TracFone falls under subsection (d) if its service connects Idaho customers to emergency 
apply to TracFone, and submits to this Court that TracFone is a "wireless carrier" providing 
telecommunications service to its customers having a place of primary use within the state of 
Idaho. Ada County and the IAC have jointly submitted their arguments concerning the 
applicability of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)(b) and § 31-4802(15) to TracFone, which are fully set 
forth in the Cross-Appellants' Joint Brief filed concurrently herewith. However, should this 
Court uphold the District Court's finding that TracFone is not a wireless carrier and thus not a 
telecommunications provider under § 3 l-4802(1 J)(b), Ada County submits that TracFone is a 
telecommunications provider under§ 31-4802(13)(d). 
11 "Changes in technology and the rapid growth of communications media have demonstrated 
that financing such systems solely by a line charge on subscribers to wireline services does not 
reflect utilization of emergency communications systems by subscribers to wireless and other 
forms of communications systems." Idaho Code§ 31-4801(1)(b). 
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communications systems provided by the state of Idaho. Since TracFone admits that its service 
provides such access, subsection (d) applies to TracFone." R. p. 1847. 
Additionally, and as discussed more fully below, the District Court correctly found that 
the provision of resold services to TracFone's customers makes TracFone a "provider of any 
other communications service." As such, TracFone is a "telecommunications provider" pursuant 
to the plain language ofldaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d). 
2. The District Court Correctly Held that TracFone's Resold Telecommunications 
Services Constitute "Other Communications Services" Under the Act. 
Regarding the applicability of subsection (d) to TracFone, the District Court ultimately 
held in its ruling on TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration that "it is clear that resold wireless 
service is precisely the kind of 'other' communications service intended to be captured by 
subsection (d) .... " 12 R. p. 1846 (emphasis in original). The District Court then took the time 
to thoroughly explain its conclusion as to why TracFone's service is an "other communications 
service" when compared to that referenced in subsection (b) of section 31-4802(13). R. p. 1037. 
12 Through this sentence, the District Court addressed TracFone's claims that it contradicted 
itself in its August 26, 2013 Memorandum Decision and Order, and clarified its position by 
replacing the word "prepaid" with "resold." R. p. 1846. Now, TracFone asserts to this Court 
that through this sentence, the District Court has changed its position on the matter. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 36-39. This assertion is incorrect, as the District Court clearly stated that 
it was simply clarifying its original ruling. TracFone asked the District Court to reconsider its 
decision by filing its Motion for Reconsideration, and it cannot complain when the District Court 
clarified its position. The clarification of an initial order resulting from a party's motion for 
reconsideration is not a proper basis for reversal. Further, and contrary to TracFone's assertions 
that this alleged "change in positions" by the District Court resulted from a poorly-written statute 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 37), the District Court's clarification had nothing to do with the wording of 
the statute, but rather had to do with an examination of TracFone's services. 
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The District Court correctly placed its primary focus on the fact that TracFone resells its 
services, stating that, 
[U]nder the statutory scheme extensively developed in the Court's order, wireless 
service provided by an unlicensed reseller (whether on a prepaid or postpaid 
basis) is nevertheless an 'other communications service' as compared to wireless 
service provided by a licensed seller. This conclusion is mandated by the fact that 
wireless service provided by such a reseller is not, as TracFone admits, a 
communications service covered under the first three definitions provided; thus it 
is "other" than the services described in those definitions, even though the result 
might be deemed a legal fiction. 
R. p. 1846 ( emphasis in original). 13 
This focus is validated by TracFone's own argument that it cannot fall under subsection 
(b) because it resells wireless service and thus cannot hold an FCC license. The fact that the 
service is resold changes the nature of the wireless service, and moves TracFone into subsection 
( d) as a provider of any other communications service that connects an individual having either a 
service address or a place of primary use within this state to an established public safety 
answering point by dialing 911. 
The District Court also based its decision on the fact that, in addition to being resold, 
TracFone's services differ from licensed sellers of wireless services in other ways, explaining: 
Moreover, contrary to its protestations, Tracfone does not simply duplicate in its 
entirety the service that would be provided by a licensed carrier like Verizon. By 
its own admissions in this litigation, Tracfone sells its own branded handsets, sells 
minutes and/or airtime in particular locations by particular methods, maintains its 
13 TracFone incorrectly labels the District Court's reliance on the fact that TracFone offers resold 
services as an "alternate/secondary rationale" for the conclusion that subsection ( d) 
unambiguously applies to TracFone. Appellant's Brief, p. 36. However, the fact that 
TracFone's services are resold is the primary distinction between TracFone's services and those 
offered by licensed sellers of wireless services. R. p. 1037. 
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own customer communications and customer service apparatus, and offers billing 
arrangements14 that may or may not be available from a licensed carrier. The 
same, of course, is true of other unlicensed resellers of communications services 
similarly situated. All of these items, along with access to wireless spectrum 
owned by the federal government, constitute the "service" being offered for sale 
by a particular provider, and serve to differentiate the communications service 
Tracfone provides from the service provided by the licensed wireless carriers, as 
well as that provided by landline service providers (subsection (a)) and voice-
over-IP service providers (subsection (c)). 
R. p. 1848. The District Court was careful to explain away TracFone's arguments to the 
contrary: 
Taken to its logical conclusion, Tracfone's position that it provides precisely the 
same service as does a licensed wireless carrier would erase the distinction 
between providers of each of the first three kinds of service set forth in section 
31-4802(13 ), as they all do essentially the same thing if reduced to their essence 
(i.e. they all provide concurrent two-way voice communication to customers). 
However, it is clear in the statute that the trappings of a particular service matter 
when determining the applicability of the Act to a particular person. This is 
undeniable from the separate subsections of section 31-4802( 13 ), which 
distinguishes service types based upon such things as the type of medium through 
which the raw information is transmitted ( e.g. landline, radio transmissions, 
Internet traffic, etc.) or the licensure of the service provider. Accordingly, it 
follows that the fairly mundane details that distinguish the services set forth in 
subsections (a)-(c) also distinguish Tracfone's service from, e.g., Verizon's, as set 
forth above. 
R. pp. 1848-1849. 
14 TracFone questions the use of the term "billing arrangements" by the District Court, and offers 
the unsupported statement that "TracFone does not render bills for its services." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 37, fn. 16. Regarding failures to cite to the Record, this Court has said, "[o]ne can only 
presume, then, that if points of authority are conspicuously missing from [a party's] argument, 
they must simply not exist. In any event, this Court is not required to go fishing through the 
record on counsel's behalf. Instead, we simply do not consider this unsupported argument on 
appeal." Petra Incorporated, 154 Idaho at 451, 299 P.3d at 258. More importantly, though, is 
that the District Court did not base its decision solely on TracFone's billing arrangements. 
Rather, it was one stick in the bundle that constitutes the District Court's analysis. 
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TracFonc offers no compelling argument that the resold services it provides to its Idaho 
customers arc not "other communications services" as provided in subsection ( d). The District 
Court, on the other hand, gave a clear and convincing analysis of how subsection ( d) covers 
TracFone. Consequently, the District Court's decision must stand. 
3. TracFone Incorrectly States That the District Court Based Its Decision on 
TracFone's Prepaid Billing Practice. 
In its initial Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court acknowledged that, 
although not advanced by TracFone in the litigation before it, 15 
[T]he Court finds it necessary to address the question of whether the monthly fee 
collection mechanism described in section 31-4804(2) excludes prepaid wireless 
service providers like Tracfone from the definition of "telecommunications 
provider" or independently exempts them from the duty to collect 911 fees even if 
such entities are telecommunications providers. 
R. p. 1035. The District Court ultimately held that the monthly collection mechanism as 
specified in the Act" ... is not a basis for creating ambiguity in a plainly unambiguous statute," 
and that it " ... neither changes the definition of 'telecommunications provider' to exclude 
prepaid wireless carriers nor provides an independent basis for relieving prepaid wireless 
carriers ... from the statutory duty to collect 911 fees each month." R. p. 1036. 
Then, when analyzing subsection (d) specifically, the District Court held: 
There is no dispute that Tracfone holds no FCC licenses, but rather resells access 
to wireless spectrum licenses by others. . . . Because prepaid wireless service 
15 Before the IPUC, TracFone repeatedly argued that the mere fact that it only sold prepaid 
services, and that the Act contemplated a monthly billing structure, it and other prepaid providers 
were exempt from the collection and remittance requirements of the Act. This fact was noted by 
the District Court. R. p. 1035. 
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provided by an unlicensed entity like Tracfone does not fall under any of 
subsections (a), (b ), or ( c) of section 31-4802(13 ), sellers of such service are 
clearly providers of a communications service other than those enumerated in the 
statute, and subsection ( d) applies. 
R. p. 1044 ( emphasis added). 
As evidenced by the language above, the District Court took into consideration the fact 
that TracFone is a prepaid provider of resold services when determining that subsection (d) 
applies. 
To the extent the District Court did not make itself perfectly clear to TracFone, it clarified 
its position in its decision on TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Upon review of the challenged passages of the decision, the Court concedes that 
where it wrote "it is clear that prepaid wireless service is precisely the kind of 
'other' communications service intended to be captured by subsection (d)," MDO 
at p. 18, the better wording would have been "it is clear that resold wireless 
service is precisely the kind of 'other' communications service intended to be 
captured by subsection (d) .... " Wording the sentence thus might make it clearer 
that, indeed, the seller's business model is not germane to whether it is a 
"telecommunications provider" under the Act, based upon the plain wording of 
the definitions statute as issue and the Act read as a whole. 
R. p. 1846 ( emphasis in original). 
In an attempt to make something out of nothing, TracFone spends ten (10) pages of its 
Appellant's Brief arguing that the District Court erred by basing its conclusion that subsection 
( d) applies on the fact that TracF one services are prepaid - "The District Court committed 
reversible error when it nevertheless determined that TracFone's wireless services could be 
shoehorned into the plainly inapplicable subsection (d), simply because TracFone provides that 
wireless services on a prepaid basis." Appellant's Brief, p. 27 (emphasis in original). 
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As is evident from reading the District Court's Memoranda, and in light of the arguments 
above, the District Court based its conclusion that TracFone provides an "other communications 
service" on the fact that it provides resold communications services, not on the fact that 
TracFone services are prepaid. 16 As the District Court clearly stated, "the seller's business 
model is not germane to whether it is a 'telecommunications provider' under the Act, based upon 
the plain wording of the definitions statute as issue and the Act read as a whole." R. p. 1846. 
TracFone's arguments to the contrary are therefore irrelevant, and need not be addressed. 
4. The District Correctly Identified Subsection (d) as a Residual Clause. 
The District Court designated subsection ( d) as a "residual clause" designed to 
encompass the remaining categories of telecommunications providers and their services not 
already more specifically defined in the proceeding subsections of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13). 
R. p. 1033. TracFone takes issue with this classification, as it necessarily encompasses TracFone 
and companies like it. 
TracFone argues that the District Court "ran afoul of the rules of statutory construction"17 
by interpreting subsection ( d) as a "catch-all" provision to include "any other providers of 
communications service." Appellant's Brief, p. 32. TracFone goes on to argue that "[a]ll of the 
specific limitations set forth in the definition of 'wireless carrier' become moot, as they are 
swallowed in their entirety by the alleged 'catch-all' provision in subsection (d)," and further 
states that the District Court's reading "ignores the legislature's explicit use of the word 'other."' 
16 Although, "prepaid" and "resold" both accurately modify the type of service that TracFone 
offers. 
17 The District Court did not engage in statutory construction, as the statute is unambiguous. 
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Id., p. 33. Instead, TracFone submits, the only way to read subsection (d) so as to not "erase 
meaningful language of the Act" is to give the words their plain meaning, and read the word 
"other" to encompass communications services that are not already covered by subsections (a), 
(b) and (c). 18 TracFone's arguments are problematic in several respects. 
First, the District Court did not determine that subsection ( d) includes "any other 
providers of communications services," but instead, it followed the exact wording of the statute, 
which reads "a provider of any other communications service." Since TracFone provides resold 
services, subsection ( d) applies. 
Second, the District Court did not ignore the word "other," or give it a meaning other 
than the plain language suggests. 19 The District Court specifically held that the resold services 
that TracFone provides is a "distinct communications service" and is thus an "other" 
communications service not already covered by Idaho Code § 31-4802(13 ). R. p. 1845. In other 
words, the District Court did exactly what TracFone says it should have done. 
18 TracFone gives itself an out by telling this Court that it need not "determine what, exactly, 
may be covered under subsection (d)." Appellant's Brief, p. 35, fn. 15. However, utilizing 
TracFone's approach, one is left to wonder exactly that - what is the purpose of subsection ( d) if 
not to encompass companies like TracFone and the services they provide? 
19 As more fully discussed by the !AC in its Response Brief, the plain meaning of the word 
"other" can have several uses. For example, it can mean "of like kind and character." Twin 
Falls County v. Hulbert, 66 Idaho 128, 140, 156 P.2d 319 (1945), overruled on other grounds 
Hulbert v. Twin Falls County, Idaho, 327 U.S. 103 (1946). It can also mean "additional or 
further," or "different from the one mentioned." Ottawa County v. Police Officers Ass'n of 
Michigan, 760 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Mich. App. 2008), citing Random House Webster's College 
Dictionary (1992). 
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5. The District Court Correctly Determined that Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) is not 
Ambiguous, and TracFone's Arguments to the Contrary Fall Short. 
In conducting its analysis, the District Court recognized "the (frankly) poor 
draftsmanship that can be seen when the preamble [ of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)] is combined 
with subsections (b) and ( d)." R. p. 1852. The District Court took the opportunity, in responding 
to TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration, to "clarify the record" regarding that statement. Id. 
The District Court quoted those two subsections together with the preamble: 
[S]ection 3 l-4802(13)(b) states that "Telecommunications provider" means any 
person providing: (b) Any wireless carrier providing telecommunications service 
to any customer having a place of primary use within this state .... " Section 
31-4802(13 )( d) suffers from the same flaw: "Telecommunications provider" 
means any person providing: (d) A provider of any other communications service 
that connects an individual [to 911]. 
Id. The District Court recognized that "[w]hether schooled in the intricacies of the English 
language or not, no reasonable person could argue that these sentences are well-written or free 
from error." Id. 
However, the District Court went on to explain its position regarding these flaws. 
That said, the Court believes that these errors in no way impact the ability of 
section 31-4802(13) to unambiguously convey the legislature's intent, and 
accordingly simply omitted the clearly erroneous extra words when quoting the 
statutory language in the challenged decision .... The Court will simply say that 
TracFone 's conclusory assertion that these errors by virtue of their mere 
existence introduce ambiguity into the statute or render it incoherent are 
unpersuasive, and the Court continues to believe that the drafting errors in section 
31-4802(13) introduce no ambiguity into this section or into the Act read as a 
whole. 
R. pp. 1852-1853 ( emphasis added). 
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Despite this logical explanation, TracFone continues to insist that simply by virtue of 
their existence, these extra words/drafting errors automatically create ambiguity in the statute.20 
TracF one then gives this Court an ultimatum: "If the statute can be plainly and unambiguously 
read in the manner that the District Court had read it, with TracFone contends it cannot, then at 
best the result is that the statute must be deemed ambiguous."21 Appellant's Brief, p. 39. 
TracFone bases this argument on its "alternate" reading of the statute, and presents to this Court 
that "more than one reasonable reading of a statute is the definition of ambiguity." Id., p. 40. 
First and foremost, TracFone presents an incomplete definition of ambiguity. As argued 
previously, a statute is ambiguous when: 
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain 
or disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not established merely 
because different possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were 
the case then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered 
ambiguous . . . . [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because as astute mind can 
devise more than one interpretation of it. 
Green River Dairy, LLC, 15 5 Idaho at 856, 318 P .3d at 625 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted) ( emphasis added). As this Court further instructed, "the fact that two different 
interpretations of a statute are presented does not alone make a statute ambiguous." Id. 
Therefore, simply because TracFone has offered a different interpretation from the District 
Court's (which also is the interpretation of the IECC, IAC and Ada County) does not mean that 
the statute is ambiguous. 
20 TracFone makes this argument for ambiguity despite spending the entire first portion of its 
Brief arguing that § 31-4802( 13) is unambiguous. 
21 In all actuality, if the statute can be plainly and unambiguously read in the manner that the 
District Court has read it, then the result is that the statute applies to TracFone. 
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Moreover, the District Court already addressed this argument head-on, and stated to 
TracFone in its Decision addressing TracFone's Motion for Reconsideration that" ... the ability 
of a party or its attorneys to propose a grammatically or syntactically supportable alternative 
reading of a statute does not make the statute ambiguous as a matter of law," particularly when 
that alternative reading is unreasonable - "Given the foregoing, the Court will not reverse its 
prior conclusion that the Act unambiguously requires unlicensed resellers of wireless service to 
collect 911 fees from their customers on a monthly basis, and TracFone 's alternative reading, 
being unreasonable, does not make the statute ambiguous." R. pp. 1854-1856 ( emphasis added). 
Additionally, TracFone's interpretations, although differing, are certainly not reasonable. 
First, TracFone leaves out a crucial component of subsection (d), namely the phrase "that 
connects an individual having either a service address or place of primary use within this state to 
an established public safety answering point by dialing 911." By including this language, the 
Legislature focused on the ability of a customer to connect to a public safety answering point. 
TracFone's customers certainly have the ability to access Idaho's emergency communications 
system by dialing 911 on TracFone's wireless phones. 
Next, TracFone's argument that because it provides "wireless" services it fits under 
subsection (b) of§ 31-4802(13), but since it does not hold an FCC license subsection (b) cannot 
actually apply, and because of all of this, subsection ( d) can never apply, is nonsensical. This "I 
would ifI could, but I can't so I won't" argument completely disregards the Legislature's stated 
purpose that the Act apply to all telecommunications providers. 
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TracFone's further argument that the Legislature intended only actual FCC licensees to 
be subject to the Fee collection and remittance requirements is just as far-fetched, as recognized 
by the District Court: 
Based upon section 31-4802(2)' s monthly fee-collection schedule and explicit 
reference to a customer's monthly bills, the Court found that the legislature 
unambiguously "did not intend the fee-collection duty created by the Act to fall 
upon entities who neither provide communications service ( e.g. retailers like 
Walmart) nor have any ongoing business relationship with the user of the access 
line in question concerning the access line .... " 
R.p.1851. 
Simply supplying a court with "different possible interpretations" is not enough to make 
a statute ambiguous. This is especially true when those "different possible interpretations" are 
unreasonable. Since TracFone's interpretations are unreasonable, its argument that the statute is 
ambiguous fails. 
D. The Legislative History, Extrinsic Evidence and Supporting Argument Submitted 
by TracFone Cannot Be Considered by this Court. 
In its continued effort to convince this Court that the statute is ambiguous ( after arguing 
repeatedly that it is not), TracFone argues that this Court must consider the legislative history 
behind the Act as well as minutes from various IECC meetings submitted in support of its 
argument that Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) does not apply to it. Since TracFone has offered no 
credible argument that subsection (d) is ambiguous, this Court (like the District Court behind it) 
cannot consider the legislative history or other extrinsic evidence as submitted by TracFone. 
Even if that information is considered, it does not bear on the correctness of the District Court's 
ultimate conclusion that TracFone is a provider of other telecommunications service that 
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connects an individual with a service address or a place of primary use within Idaho to an 
established public safety answering point by dialing 911. 
1. Since Idaho Code§ 31-4802(13)(d) is Unambiguous, Any Alleged Statements by 
Individual Members of the IECC are Irrelevant and Cannot Be Considered by this 
Court. 
One of the bases for TracFone's argument for ambiguity is the" ... volume of documents 
demonstrating that the members of the IECC had historically interpreted the Act as not 
applicable to sellers of prepaid services like TracFone .... " Appellant's Brief, p. 40. TracFone 
spends several pages discussing these meeting minutes and what was purportedly discussed at 
the meetings.22 Appellant's Brief, pp. 40-44. TracFone asserts that the "sole question for which 
TracFone submitted the [IECC meeting] Minutes was to demonstrate that reasonable minds ... 
could disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the Act plainly and unambiguously 
applied to TracFone." Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42. TracFone further states that, "[a]s an 
alternative to its argument that the statute unambiguously does not cover TracFone, TracFone 
submitted the Minutes to demonstrate that the District Court's decision to apply the statute to 
TracFone could not be regarded as the only reasonable way to read the statute .... " Id., p. 42. 
22 It appears that TracFone may be making a veiled attempt at an equitable estoppel argument 
when it refers to the IECC meeting minutes. However, the general rule is that "equitable 
estoppel may not ordinarily be invoked against a governmental or public agency functioning in a 
sovereign or governmental capacity." Young Electric Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 810, 
25 P.3d 117, 123 (2001). Even if it did apply in this case, one of the elements of equitable 
estoppel is "a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive 
knowledge of the truth." Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 
831, 845, 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003). Here, TracFone has not, and cannot, point to any fact that 
indicates a false representation or concealment of a material fact by the IECC. See Id. 
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TracFone is attempting create ambiguity in the statute by relying on these meeting 
minutes. However, TracFone has inverted the analysis. The literal, unambiguous words of 
subsection ( d) do not warrant the consideration of any extrinsic evidence. 
The District Court could not consider TracFone's "volume of documents" when reaching 
its decision that Idaho Code § 31-4802( 13 )( d) applies to TracF one. These meeting minutes were 
never considered, as the District Court recognized that the statements were irrelevant. 23 
[I]t is undisputed that the only official position taken by the commission on this 
issue is that Tracfone was and is obligated under the Act; there is no statement by 
the Commission endorsing Tracfone's reading of the statute for the Court to 
consider as evidence of ambiguity in the statute. The unadopted statements of 
individual commission members are simply entitled to no weight with regard to 
the question presented, and are irrelevant. 
R. p. 1843 (emphasis in original). 
Although nothing cited by TracFone shows that the IECC took an affirmative position 
that TracFone and other prepaid wireless providers need not comply with the fee collection and 
remittance requirements of the Act, any such statements would be a mistaken statement of law, 
not of fact. See Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130,138,997 P.2d 591, 
599 (2000). "The general rule is that administrative officers of the state cannot estop the state 
through mistaken statements oflaw."24 Id 
23 Ada County notes that even if the statements of individual IECC members are relevant, they 
have no precedential effect on Ada County or the other forty-three ( 43) counties in this state. 
24 As previously argued, the issue of whether the Fee imposed by the Act is a "fee" or a "tax" has 
not been argued to or decided by this Court, and Ada County fully adopts the IAC's arguments 
concerning this matter. See IAC's Response Brief. Whether it is a "fee" or a "tax," the state 
(and the counties) cannot be estopped from collecting any "fee" or "tax" owed to them. Should 
the Court conclude the 911 Fee is a tax, "[i]n the levy and imposition of taxes, the state acts in its 
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As such, any alleged statements made by individual members of the IECC are irrelevant 
to a reading of the statute, and do not bear on the correctness of the District Court's decision. 
2. Since § 31-4802(13)(d) is not Ambiguous, the Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
Preclude the Consideration of Legislative History. 
TracFone, in another attempt to show that the Act is ambiguous, spends several pages 
discussing the Act's legislative history. Appellant's Brief, pp. 45-50. Once again, TracFone 
forgets that "where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic 
evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature." Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506. In an attempt to persuade the Court to 
ignore this basic tenet of statutory interpretation and nonetheless consider the legislative history 
and extrinsic evidence it submits, TracFone argues: 
[T]he amended definition [subsection (d)] was imprecisely drafted by the 
Legislature and therefore is not able to be read on its plain and literal meaning if 
the differences between types of services are disregarded. LC. § 73-113(1). 
Without a significant amount of guesswork as to what the Legislature may have 
intended, subsection ( d) cannot be clearly and unambiguously read to support the 
District Court's conclusion that the 2007 amendments were enacted to obligate 
resellers of wireless service ("whether on a prepaid or postpaid basis") to collect 
and remit the E911 fee. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4 7 ( emphasis in original). 
sovereign capacity, and hence, in an action for the collection thereof, cannot be subjected to an 
equitable estoppel." State v. Adams, 90 Idaho 195, 201, 409 P.2d 415, 419 (1965). "The 
government is not estopped by previous acts or conduct of its agents with reference to the 
determination of tax liabilities or by failure to collect the tax, nor will the mistakes or 
misinformation of its officers estop it from collecting the tax." Id. at 202,419. 
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This argument puts the cart before the horse. TracFone argues that the legislative history 
( and the IECC commission members' statements) makes the statute ambiguous. However, the 
rules of statutory interpretation require a court to first look to the language of the statute itself. 
The interpretation of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute; 
those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the 
statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this court 
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." 
Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506. One does not even reach the legislative history or 
comments by the IECC, as the literal words of subsection (d) clearly show that if an entity 
provides a communications service that allows its customers to dial 911, then that entity is a 
telecommunications provider under § 31-4802(13)( d) and the fee collection and remittance 
duties of the Act apply. 
Given the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the whole body of the law 
when it enacts new legislation, we must presume that the Idaho Legislature was fully aware of 
what it was doing when it enacted subsection (d). See Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 478, 716 
P.2d 1238, 1250 (1986). TracFone's arguments to the contrary are therefore unpersuasive. 
3. The 2013 Bill is Extrinsic Evidence and is Irrelevant to the Statutory Analysis. 
In yet another attempt to convince this Court to consider extrinsic evidence prior to 
reviewing the literal words of the statute, TracFone spends another five (5) pages discussing the 
2013 Bill. Appellant's Brief, pp. 50-54. The District Court rightly discounted TracFone's 
similar arguments and did not consider the Bill in its analysis, holding that "[b ]ecause the Court 
has concluded that the relevant language of the statute is unambiguous, there is no occasion for 
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the Court to consult extrinsic evidence like pending amending legislation, and the Court will not 
do so." R. p. 1857. 
In support of its position, TracFone offers "one of the remaining canons25 yet to be 
analyzed in the context of this statute ... which deals with the Legislature's decision to amend 
an existing statute." Appellant's Brief, p. 53. TracFone then cites two cases in support of its 
position. 
It is a well-established rule of this Court that where an amendment is made it 
carries with it the presumption that the legislature intended the statute thus 
amended to have a meaning different than theretofore accorded it. Treasure 
Valley Concrete, Inc. v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 676, 978 P.2d 233, 236 (1999) 
( emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). That rule of construction 
indicates not only the intention of the new law but also that of the old. Leonard 
Const. Co. v. State ex rel. State Tax Commission, 96 Idaho at 896 ( emphasis 
added). 
Appellant's Brief, p. 53 (emphasis in original). TracFone made a similar and unsuccessful 
argument to the District Court, which noted that the canon set forth in the Leonard case is 
"trumped" by the canon that "where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislature." R. pp. 1856-1857. In a "belt and suspenders" endeavor, the District 
Court went on to say: 
Alternatively, assuming pending amending legislation is not to be considered 
"extrinsic" evidence, the Court notes that the fact that pending legislation is set to 
significantly alter the fee-collection framework applicable to prepaid wireless 
service in no way compels the conclusion advanced by Tracfone, i.e. that the 
25 Ada County notes that this is a canon of statutory construction, not of statutory interpretation, 
which is inapplicable to an unambiguous statute. In re Adoption of Doe, 156 Idaho at---, 326 
P.3d at 352. 
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existing Act was not intended to (and did not) address that topic. Under the plain 
language of the existing Act, unlicensed resellers of wireless communications 
services are obligated to collect 911 fees from their customers each month. Under 
the amending legislation effective in 2014, this obligation is codified in and 
significantly elaborated upon in section 31-4813. The chief difference between 
the existing Act and the pending amendments, regarding prepaid wireless service, 
is that the amendments do away with the monthly fee-collection schedule and 
adjusts the amount of the fee to account for the manner in which prepaid services 
are purchased. This amending legislation speaks for itself and nothing contained 
within it suggests that the existing statute, contrary to its plain language as set 
forth in section 31-4804(2) read in conjunction with section 31-4802(13)(d), did 
not encompass unlicensed resellers of wireless communications services or 
prepaid wireless service generally. 
R. p. 1857. 
Even if the 2013 Bill should be considered, it does not do what TracFone says it does. As 
the District Court said, the Bill does away with the monthly collection requirement and changes 
the amount of the Fee. In any event, it has no bearing on the analysis in this appeal. 
E. A Reading of the Act in its Entirety, as Required by Idaho Law, Supports a Finding 
that the Statute Applies to TracFone. 
As this Court has instructed, "[t]he objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
legislative intent. Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue." Green 
River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho at 856,318 P.3d at 625. 
Fortunately, the Idaho Legislature devoted the entire first section of the Emergency 
Communications Act to the law's purpose, which is consistent with the District Court, Ada 
County, IAC, and IECC's interpretation of the Act. The opening paragraph of the section states: 
The legislature recognizes that providing consolidated emergency 
communications systems is vital in enhancing the public health, safety, and 
welfare of the residents of the state of Idaho. The legislature further finds that 
there is an obvious need for providing a means to finance the initiation, 
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maintenance, operation, enhancement and governance of consolidated emergency 
communications systems. 
Idaho Code § 31-4801 ( emphasis added). The Legislature clearly recognized that providing 
emergency communications is vital to Idaho's public health, safety, and welfare. It also 
recognized the need to enhance funding in order to provide effective, accessible and state-of-the-
art 911 systems. 
Noteworthy is a finding the Legislature made regarding the demand wireless services 
place on 911 resources: 
( d) Utilization of cellular telephones and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) 
communications to access emergency communications systems has substantially 
increased citizen access to emergency services while at the same time increasing 
demands upon the emergency response system. 
Id. ( emphasis added). The Legislature understood the reality that increased demand requires 
better communications and more sophisticated equipment, which results in increased costs to 
emergency response systems. The Legislature therefore required all users to pay the 911 Fees by 
including "telephone lines, wireless, VoIP or other communications services that connect an 
individual dialing 911 to an established public safety answering point." Id. 
TracFone urges this Court to ignore this stated purpose and focus instead on convoluted 
arguments that misinterpret Idaho law. This is an improper focus, since the Legislature intended 
those who use the emergency communications system to pay into the emergency 
communications system. The Legislature did not create a "TracFone" exemption from the 911 
Fee requirements, and it is improper for TracFone to ask this Court to create such an exemption, 
as its customers have access to and utilize the 911 system throughout Idaho. The Legislature has 
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clearly set forth its intent, and courts are not at liberty to alter it. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 
P.2d at 506. 
The District Court recognized the need to analyze§ 31-4802(13)(d) in light of the entire 
Act. "It bears repeating, as the Court was careful to do throughout its opinion, that the Court's 
conclusion is further buttressed when the Act is read as a whole, to include section 31-4801. ... " 
R. p. 1849. The District Court recognized the importance of the fact that the statement of 
purpose is "part of the statute itself" rather than being a "mere descriptive phrase" contained in 
the session laws. Id. Importantly, the District Court recognized that it "may not ignore a public 
safety determination clearly and unambiguously made by the legislature establishing a method to 
insure a funding mechanism is available to assure Idaho citizens of an adequately funded 
emergency 911 service within the state." R. p. 1048. 
Perhaps the District Court said it best when it held, "The unambiguous language of the 
statute is plainly intended to assure that all those who benefit from the provision of 
state-provided 911 services, as well as those who generate their profits by selling 
communications services to them, share in the cost of these services rather than enjoy a 
proverbial free lunch." R. p. 1850. 
F. The Kentucky Case Provided by TracFone is Easily Distinguishable, and Actually 
Supports Ada County's Position. 
TracFone directs this Court to Virgin Mobile USA, LP v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
2012-SC-000621-DG (2014) which, according to TracFone, says "addressed an exceedingly 
similar question regarding the applicability of its state 911 fee statute to providers of prepaid 
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wireless services." Appellant's Brief, p. 30. TracFone describes the case as "highly analogous" 
to the present appeal. Id., p. 31. However, the Kentucky Court's decision was based entirely on 
the wording of its own state's 911 fee collection statute, and when read carefully, the opinion 
actually suggests that if the language in Kentucky's statute read like Idaho's, Virgin Mobile 
would have been obligated to pay. 
Overlooked by TracFone, there are several differences between Kentucky's 911 statute 
and Idaho's. Most significantly, Kentucky's statute mandates that its providers: 
[S]hall, as part of the provider's normal monthly billing process, collect the 
CMRS service charges levied upon CMRS connections under KRS 65.7629(3) 
from each CMRS connection to whom the billing provider provides CMRS. Each 
billing provider shall list the CMRS service charge as a separate entry on each 
bill which includes CMRS service charge. 
Virgin Mobile USA, LP, at 3 (emphasis added). The Court determined that the statutory 
language was so monthly-billing-specific that "[u]nder the prepaid-CMRS plan, collecting the 
CMRS service charge in a manner consistent with the mandate of KRS 65.7635(1) was not 
physically or conceptually possible because prepaid CMRS users and providers had no 'normal 
monthly billing' cycle." Id. at 5 ( emphasis added). Because Kentucky law so micro-managed 
the fee-billing procedure, providers became a virtual "collection agent for the CMRS fund, [ and] 
the CMRS provider is bound to the "principal's manifestations to the agent" on how to collect the 
fee." Id. at 12. Holding that the statute's billing specificity actually omitted prepaid services, the 
Court explained: 
Finally, we cannot fail to note that KRS 65.7635(1) expressly commands that 
"each billing provider" shall include the service charge as an item on the 
customer's monthly bill.. .. Virgin is a "CMRS provider," but it clearly is not a 
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"billing provider" because it sends no bills. Since all of the service it sold was 
paid for in advance, its customers never owed Virgin for CMRS service; because 
it had no monthly bills to send out to customers, Virgin had no "normal monthly 
billing process" and therefore cannot reasonably be deemed to be a "billing" 
provider. 
Id. at 13-14. The Court emphasized that its decision was state-specific, underscoring that point 
in a footnote: "The issue has now been litigated in several states, with results going both ways 
depending upon the specific wording of each state's statutes." Id. at fn.5. The Court advised 
lawmakers that "The legislature could have spoken with regard to the collection of CMRS 
service charges in general terms broad enough to have enacted a statute flexible enough to 
accommodate even unforeseen technological or commercial developments." Id. at 16 (emphasis 
added). 
The reasoning set out in the Virgin Mobile decision undermines TracFone's position, as 
Kentucky required providers to include the fee charges in their monthly billing as the only 
method to collect the fee. Therefore, the statute could never apply to prepaid providers. 
Contrary to Kentucky's required monthly billing methodology, Idaho's flexible collection 
statute allows fees to be listed on a customer's monthly bill, but does not mandate a specific 
method to collect 911 fees. Rather, 
[t]he fee shall be imposed upon and collected from purchasers of access lines or 
interconnected VoIP service lines with a service address or place of primary use 
within the county or 911 service area on a monthly basis by all 
telecommunications providers of such services. The fee may be listed as a 
separate item on customers' monthly bills. 
Idaho Code § 31-4804(2) ( emphasis added). 
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TracFone's argument that the Virgin Mobile case supports its position therefore fails. 
G. The District Court Properly Granted Ada County's Motion to Strike. 
In support of its Motion for Reconsideration, TracFone submitted affidavits from Thomas 
J. Lloyd, counsel for TracFone ("Lloyd Affidavit"), and Leighton W. Lang, Senior Vice-
President and Assistant General Counsel for TracFone ("Lang Affidavit"). R. pp. 1102-1672; 
1068-1101. Each Affidavit contained testimony and attachments - the Lloyd Affidavit included 
566 pages of IECC meeting minutes, and the Lang Affidavit contained a pamphlet downloaded 
from the internet. Ada County objected to the submission of the Affidavits and attachments and 
moved to strike both pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence ("l.R.E.") 402. 
The District Court heard Ada County's Motion to Strike on November 25, 2013, and 
struck the bulk of both Affidavits and attachments from the bench. 11/25/13 Tr. p. 142, 11. 8-25; 
p. 143, I. 1. The District Court explained:" ... the Court will consider Mr. Lloyd's affidavit only 
to the extent it goes to what if any deference the Court should give to any prior agency 
discussions. Somebody is going to have to show me that they (the IECC] adopted a position, not 
that they adopted minutes." Id., p. 142. 11. 8-14. 
In its eventual written Decision, the District Court continued: 
The Court has now reviewed those portions of the minutes cited by TracFone and, 
finding no such statement, now fully grants the state's (sic] motion to strike the 
exhibit as irrelevant, since the statements of commission members which, 
although recorded in the official minutes kept by the Commission, are not adopted 
by the commission as a whole as representative of the official position of that 
body [ and] have no bearing on the primary issue presented for reconsideration, 
i.e. whether the Court erred in finding that the Act's fee-collection duty 
unambiguously applies to TracFone. 
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R. pp. 1842-1843. In a footnote, the District Court further explained: 
In oral dicta, the Court indicated that it might be required to give some deference 
to an executive agency's interpretation of the law it is tasked with administering if 
that agency had officially taken a position regarding a particular issue. However, 
whether the Court correctly recalled this principle of law or not is irrelevant, 
because Tracfone has not cited any such official position set forth in the minutes 
comprising exhibit "A." Moreover, Tracfone has expressly stated that it is not 
asserting that any such deference is owed in this case. 
R. p. 1842. 
TracFone now appeals the District Court's granting of Ada County's Motion to Strike. 
However, as shown below, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when making its ruling, 
and its decision to strike the evidence and testimony offered by TracFone should stand. 
1. Standard of Review. 
Regarding a court's ruling on the admissibility of affidavits, this Court explained that it: 
. . . applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's 
determination of the admissibility of affidavits offered to support or oppose a 
motion for summary judgment. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 273, 281 
P.3d 103, 110 (2012). A district court does not abuse its discretion "if it (1) 
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of 
discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision 
through an exercise of reason." Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 
145 Idaho 904,909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)). 
Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, ---, 320 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2014). 
Since the District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion, applied the correct legal 
standards, and reached its decision through an exercise of reason when granting Ada County's 
Motion to Strike, TracFone's appeal should be denied. 
41 
2. The District Court Properly Struck the Lloyd and Lang Affidavits, As They Are 
Extrinsic Evidence that is Irrelevant to the Legal Analysis of an Unambiguous 
Statute. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("IRCP") and case law set forth the requirements for 
the admissibility of affidavits offered in support of a summary judgment motion. I.R.C.P. 56(e) 
explains that "supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein .... " In Cates v. Albertson's, Inc., 126 Idaho 
1030, 895 P.2d 1223 (1995), Ball, the attorney representing Cates, authored an affidavit that was 
objected to. This Court determined Ball's affidavit was improper and could not be considered, 
explaining: 
Ball's affidavit is not based upon personal knowledge as required by Rule 56(e). 
The only evidence offered through the Ball affidavit is worker's compensation 
records from Market Transport/United Express attached as exhibits to the 
affidavit. Nothing in Ball's affidavit establishes that Ball has any personal 
knowledge of either the accidents discussed in the records or the preparation and 
maintenance of the records themselves. Because the affidavit fails to establish 
that Ball is competent to testify as to the matters contained therein, this Court will 
not consider the contents of the affidavit in opposition to Albertson's affidavit. .. 
It is Cates' burden to affirmatively show that Ball is competent to testify to the 
matters contained in the affidavit and that the affidavit is based on Ball's personal 
knowledge. Because the Ball affidavit fails to affirmatively establish that Ball has 
personal knowledge of the contents of the records offered through that affidavit or 
that the affidavit sets forth facts that would be admissible at trial, the contents of 
and exhibits to that affidavit will not be considered in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Cates, 126 Idaho at 1034, 895 P.2d at 1227. 
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TracFone appeals the District Court's ruling upholding Ada County's objection to the 
IECC minutes,26 asserting: 
Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, whether or not the IECC ever 
officially adopted as an entity the opinions expressed by its members is not 
relevant ... Rather, the sole question for which TracFone submitted the Minutes 
was to demonstrate that reasonable minds (including those collective minds that 
make up the IECC) could disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the 
Act plainly and unambiguously applied to TracFone. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42 (emphasis in original). 
TracFone argues that comments found in the meeting minutes must be considered by a 
court when interpreting a state statute because "reasonable minds may differ."27 Ada County 
submits that the District Court's refusal to admit and consider the comments was correct for a 
number of reasons. First, extrinsic evidence may not be considered by a court when a statute's 
meaning is unambiguous and clear on its face. Second, as the District Court recognized, unless 
the IECC officially adopted a position, comments from individual members do not reflect an 
26 TracFone's Appellant's Brief only argues in support of admission of the IECC minutes, 
ignoring the testimony portion of the Lloyd Affidavit as well as the testimony and attachments 
contained in the Lang Affidavit. Accordingly, Ada County responds only to the IECC minutes 
arguments, since this Court "[W]ill not consider an issue not 'supported by argument and 
authority in the opening brief."' Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 
(2008); see also l.A.R. 35(a)(6); see also DAFCO v. Stewart Title, 156 Idaho 749,---, 331 P.3d 
491,496 (2014) ("The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of 
the transcript and the record relied upon."). 
27 A close reading suggests it is more likely that the comments were the product of frustration 
with a segment of the wireless industry for withholding needed resources from Idaho's E911 
providers, thwarting the IECC's mission "to assist" emergency providers. 
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official or "collective" position. Finally, the IECC is not a state agency responsible for 
administering state law, and even if it was, statements in its minutes are not relevant to assist a 
court with the determination of a legal issue. These arguments are discussed more fully below. 
a. The IECC Minutes are Irrelevant to the Interpretation of an Unambiguous 
Statute. 
Because the Act unambiguously applies to TracFone, there was no reason for the District 
Court to look outside the plain and literal meaning of the Act for its interpretation and 
application. As this Court very recently explained: 
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). 
"Such intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue." St. 
Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Brd. ofComm'rs of Ada Cnty., 146 Idaho 753, 755, 
203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). "Statutory interpretation begins with 'the literal words 
of the statute, and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning."' Seward v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 511, 65 P.3d 531, 
533 (2003) (quoting Jen-Rath Co. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 335, 48 P.3d 
659, 664 (2002)). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, 'the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no 
occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction."' St. Luke's Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., Ltd., 146 Idaho at 755, 203 P.3d at 685_(quoting Payette River Prop. 
Owners Assn. v. Bd. of Comm'rs. of Valley Cnty., 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 
4 77, 483 (1999) ). This is because "[ t ]he asserted purpose for enacting the 
legislation cannot modify its plain meaning." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93, 265 P.3d 502, 505-06 (2011). 
Idaho Youth Ranch v. Ada County, --- P.3d ---, 2014 WL 4656519. 
The extrinsic IECC meeting minutes are not admissible to interpret the unambiguous 
language of the Act. 
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b. TracFone Failed to Produce an Official Position Adopted by the IECC. 
While the District Court did not rule that meeting minutes could never be relevant for 
some purpose, it required TracFone to show how a comment by an individual volunteer IECC 
member reflected an official "position" of the IECC.28 The basis for the District Court's 
requirement is fundamental - a comment by an individual member is not a "position" adopted by 
an appointed or elected group unless adopted by the collective body.29 TracFone failed to 
provide the District Court with any evidence that the IECC adopted a position on this issue. 
More importantly, as noted by the District Court in its ruling on Ada County's Motion to Strike, 
"This argument is unavailing, because it is undisputed that the only official position taken by the 
Commission on this issue is that Tracfone was and is obligated under the Act. ... " R. p. 1843. 
c. The IECC is not a State Agency. 
TracFone also argues that the IECC's minutes support its position because, "[F]or years 
preceding this litigation, the enforcing state agency responsible for administering the statute 
repeatedly discussed the need for amending and indeed 'fix[ing]' the statute .... " Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7 (emphasis added). TracFone writes that the IECC was "created by Idaho Code§ 31-
4815 for the purpose of administering the Act." Id., pp. 8-9 (emphasis added). TracFone 
continues: "This case arises out of several years' worth of analysis of the Act's scope by the 
28 "Somebody is going to have to show me that they [the IECC] adopted a position, not that they 
adopted minutes." 11/25/13 Tr. p. 142, 11. 8-14. 
29 See e.g. Robert's Rules of Order Revised, General Henry M. Robert, 1915 Version, § 4, "A 
motion is a proposal that the assembly take certain action, or that it express itself as holding 
certain views." 
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members of the IECC, during which time there was a well-documented and uniform 
understanding that the Act, as written, did not encompass prepaid wireless services." Id., p. 13. 
Contrary to TracFone's characterization, the IECC is not a "state agency" with 
"enforcement" and "administrative" duties. The Idaho Legislature created the IECC as a thirteen 
(13) member volunteer30 commission comprised of representatives from various law 
enforcement and emergency response organizations. It is charged to meet at least annually, and 
to "assist" cities, counties, ambulance districts and fire districts in the establishment, 
management, operations and accountability of consolidated emergency communications 
systems. See Idaho Code § 31-4815. 
Though not a "state agency" with "enforcement" and "administration" duties, if the IECC 
was a state agency, TracFone's argument would still not succeed. As explained by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court: 
However, when an agency's decision is based on the "agency's interpretation of a 
statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue," we are not bound by the 
agency's interpretation ( citation omitted). Statutory interpretation involves the 
examination of legal issues and is, therefore, a question of law subject to de novo 
review. McGovern v. Rutgers, 21 l_N.J. 94, 107-08 (2012); Russo, 206 N.J. at 
27; State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176, 989 A.2d 256 (2010). 
Saccone v. Board of Trustees, --- A.3d ---, 2014 N.J. LEXIS 893, 2014 WL 2014 4450553. This 
Court agrees that statements, acts or conduct by state agencies do not bind Idaho governments. 
"The general rule is that administrative officers of the state cannot estop the state through 
30 Pursuant to Idaho Code § 59-509(b ), IECC members serve without compensation, but are 
reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses. 
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mistaken statements of law." Sagewillow, Inc .. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 
831, 845, 70 P.3d 669, 683 (2003). 
Notably, TracFone did not support its argument with any applicable law. The IECC 
minutes are not evidence of the IECC's or the Legislature's intent, nor do they assist this Court's 
analysis. Individual IECC member statements, thoughts or opinions about a statute are simply 
not authoritative. Given the lack of law supporting TracFone's claims, and considering the 
argument above, the District Court correctly ruled that the IECC minutes are not relevant to its 
interpretation of the Act. 
H. TracFone Is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
TracFone initiated this action against the IECC, and failed to name any Idaho county. 
The IECC filed its answer and counterclaim, which TracFone moved to dismiss because no 
Idaho counties were parties to the lawsuit. In response to TracFone's motion to dismiss, Ada 
County and the IAC moved the District Court to join the lawsuit initiated by TracFone. 
In an attempt to obtain a prompt answer to TracFone 's legal question, Ada County joined 
the IECC and IAC in a combined motion for summary judgment. The IECC and Counties 
prevailed when the District Court ruled that the 911 Fee requirements applied to TracFone.31 
Unhappy with the outcome, TracFone filed a Motion to Reconsider its summary judgment loss. 
On reconsideration TracFone lost again. Still not happy, TracFone filed its appeal. 
31 Before TracFone filed this lawsuit, the IPUC also ruled that the 911 fees applied to TracFone. 
R. p. 932. 
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TracFone's position is not strong but is consistent with the IPUC's comment: "[t]he 
testimony and supporting documentation ... [show] that contesting the payment of these fees is an 
orchestrated and Company-wide business decision ... it is evident to this Commission that it is 
TracFone's policy to vigorously contest the applicability and payment of these fees." R. p. 933. 
TracFone's refusal to pay its share of the 911 Fees now forces the IECC and counties to 
participate in its lawsuit and compel it to comply with Idaho law. TracFone has been told by the 
IPUC once and by the District Court twice that the Act applies to it. TracFone now boldly 
invites this Court to assess attorney fees against the IECC and Idaho counties, arguing that there 
is "no existing basis at law to impose the E911" fees against it. Appellant's Brief, p. 55. 
TracFone seeks attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117(1), which allows for fees 
where a political subdivision is a party, and "the nonprevailing party acted without reasonable 
basis in fact or law." See Sanders v. Bd. of Trs. of the Mt. Home Sch. Dist. No. 193, 322 P.3d 
1002, 2014 Ida. LEXIS 125 (Idaho 2014). The position taken by Ada County, the IAC and the 
IECC is the only position throughout this case that is reasonably based in both fact and law. 
Given that the IECC, IAC, Ada County, IPUC and the District Court all agree that the 
Act applies to TracFone, its request for fees is nonsensical. 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Should Ada County prevail on appeal, it hereby requests costs and attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code§§ 12-121, 12-123, and/or I.A.R. 41. For the same reasons that TracFone is not 
entitled to an award of its fees on appeal, Ada County is entitled to an award of its fees. 
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TracFone has now litigated the identical question three times, and Ada County suggests that 
TracFone's arguments on appeal, like those it has made previously, have not been strong. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the District Court said it best when it held, "The unambiguous language of the 
statute is plainly intended to assure that all those who benefit from the provision of state-
provided 911 services, as well as those who generate their profits by selling communications 
services to them, share in the cost of these services rather than enjoy a proverbial free lunch." 
R. p. 1850. By consistently refusing to collect and remit the 911 Fees, TracFone, the largest 
provider of prepaid wireless services in the United States, is attempting to secure this free lunch. 
Ada County respectfully requests that this Court uphold the District Court's decision that the 
plain language of Idaho Code § 31-4802(13)( d) unambiguously shows that TracFone is a 
"telecommunications provider" and that the Act's Fee collection and remittance duties apply. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October 2014. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
c·-: Q Lt.i1 '---By: ~-- \..t--\...,Lz_ (.,., 
Sherry A. Morg 
Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorne 
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